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The first session of the 87th Congress convened at noon on January 3,
1961, in an atmosphere dominated by the forthcoming inaugeration of Senator
John Fitzgerald Kennedy as the 35th President of the United States. Three
days later, for the first time in a century, it became the duty of the defeated
Presidential candidate, Vice President Richard M. Nixon, presiding over a
joint session of Congress officially to declare Mr. Kennedy as the election
winner. The last time that odd circumstance had occurred had been in 1861,
when Vice President John Breckenridge had had to declare the election of
Abraham Lincoln.
The ensuing session of Congress turned out to be the longest session
in a decade and, among other things, was notable for the fact that an all-time
record was established in the number of bills and resolutions which were in-
troduced. There were 14,026 to be exact. Of these, 401 eventually became
public laws and 284 became private laws.
At the moment, however, we are only concerned with one of these public
laws, "an act making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the
o
fiscal year ending June 30, 1962, and for other purposes." In seventeen and
one-half pages of printed text, this law appropriated some $46.7 billion for
national defense -- the largest defense appropriation in any single year since
the Korean war.
Henrietta and Nelson Poynter (eds.), Congressional Quarterly Almanac
,
Vol. XVII: 87th Congress, 1st Session, 1961 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly Inc., 1961), p. 24.
2Public Law 87-144, approved August 17, 1961.
.
2But we are concerned really only with a part of that law rather than
with the entire law, and then only in a generic way rather than in a specific
sense. To get to the point, this paper deals with those portions of recent
annual defense appropriation acts which provide funds for Marine Corps person-
nel, operation and maintenance, and procurement. In the law just cited, the
pertinent paragraphs constitute about five percent of the text and appropriate
$1.1 billion, or less than two and one-half percent of the total funds provided
to the Department of Defense. Inasmuch as the language is more or less typi-
cal of that used in other years and since our attention is to be further
focused on the legislative hearings and procedures which result in the specific
language, it may be well to put down at this point extracts of the cited law
to illustrate what a simple matter it is for the Congress to provide for the
spending of over one billion dollars by the Marine Corps.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the following
sums are appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1962, for military




Military Personnel, Marine Corps
For pay, allowances, individual clothing, subsistence, interest
on deposits, gratuities, permanent change of station travel (including
all expenses thereof for organizational movements), expenses of tempo-
rary duty travel between permanent duty stations, for members of the
Marine Corps on active duty (except those undergoing reserve training),
and expenses of apprehension and delivery of deserters, prisoners, and
members absent without leave, including payment of rewards of not to
exceed $25 in any one case, $629,000,000, and, in addition $11,000,000,
to be derived by transfer from the Marine Corps stock fund.

Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps
For pay, allowances, clothing, subsistence, gratuities, travel, and
related expenses for personnel of the Marine Corps Reserve and the
Marine Corps platoon leaders class on active duty while undergoing
reserve training, or while performing drills or equivalent duty, as
authorized by law, $26,400,000.
TITLE II
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps
For expenses, necessary for the operation and maintenance of the
Marine Corps including equipment and facilities; procurement of mili-
tary personnel; training and education of regular and reserve personnel,
including tuition and other costs incurred at civilian schools; welfare
and recreation; utility services for buildings erected at private cost
as authorized by law, and buildings on military reservations authorized
by Navy regulations to be used for welfare and recreational purposes;
conduct of schoolrooms, service clubs, chapels, and other instructional,
entertainment, and welfare expenses for the enlisted men; procurement
and manufacture of military supplies, equipment and clothing; hire of
passenger motor vehicles; transportation of things; medals, awards,
emblems and other insignia; losses in exchange and in accounts of dis-
bursing officers, as authorized by law; operation of station hospitals,




For expenses necessary for the procurement, manufacture, and
modification of missiles, armament, ammunition, military equipment,
and vehicles for the Marine Corps, including purchase of not to ex-
ceed three hundred and seventeen passenger motor vehicles which shall





4Now the thoughtful reader who is knowledgeable In the ways of defense
appropriations will immediately recognize that the above paragraphs do not
by any means exhaust the ways in which the Marine Corps benefits from annual
appropriations. For instance, in separate bills during 1961, Congress
appropriated almost another billion dollars to the Department of Defense for
military construction^ and $45 million as supplemental funds, notably for
Navy shipbuilding. Furthermore, he vrili know that Marine Corps aviation,
for instance, benefits directly fron the funds appropriated for procurement
and for operation and maintenance of the Navy, and that the Marine Corps'
research, deve lorment , test and evaluation effort is financed through the
other "services.
Why, then, should this paper concern itself only with those portions
6
of the appropriations cited? The answer is that by so doing we are provided
with a means for examination of the congressional appropriation procedure as
it applies to the Marine Corps. Only in connection with these particular
appropriations is it possible to examine in isolation the interplay of cause
and effect among and between the congressmen on the Appropriations Committees
of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the marines who annually
appear before them to justify and explain the Marine Corps' request for funds.
While Marine Corps witnesses appear in support of procurement of aircraft and
missiles for the Navy, for instance, it is not possible to separate out the
results, if any, of their effectiveness or lack of effectiveness during the
^Public Law 87-302, approved September 26, 1961.




5hearings. Presumably, such effects would be easier to detect in the appropria-
tions made directly to and solely for the Marine Corps.
Specifically, this paper has for its purposes the examination of the
following interrelated areas:
1. Procedural matters in Congress which relate to Marine Corps
appropriations
.
2. The conduct of appropriation hearings and the effectiveness of
witnesses.
3. Recent trends in certain appropriations for the Marine Corps.
Excluded from this study are considerations of the appropriations or
budgeting procedures through the Department of Defense or Bureau of the Budget,
or of subsequent apportionment procedures or policy determinations as to the
use of funds which have been appropriated, except insofar as these matters may
impinge on congressional appropriation actions. Likewise, not considered here
are the closely related functions and actions of the Armed Services Committees
of the Senate and House. Not that such matters have no effect on the ultimate
strength and capability of the Marine Corps. Quite the contraryl It is
rather that this paper is attempting to concentrate on the Marine Corps con-
gressional appropriation aspect of the larger problem of national security.
In addition to the personal desire of the author to become better
acquainted with congressional action vis-a-vis Marine Corps appropriations, it
was hoped also that two commonly held assumptions in this area might be tested
and validated.
One of these assumptions is that "the degree of success in obtaining
funds from Congress is dependent on
. . .
the ability of the witness to
justify not only the funds requested but also the program if the need

6arises. ' 7 Is there, in fact, • direct and measurable relationship between
how wall a witness performs and the dollars the Marine Corps gets? If not,
it must be concluded that some other considerations are of greater significance
-- for instance, the written justif ications for the funds.
The other assumption to be tested and validated is that:
In terms of the aggregate figures, the Congress makes small rather
than large changes in the President's figures. A bona fide cut in the
President's appropriation requests of as much as 5 percent, even by a
hostile Congress, is the exception rather than the rule. The normal
i
.-^ttern of Congressional action is for the House to make a substantial
cut in the budget total, for the Senate to restore a large part of the
cut, and for the conference to reach a compromise that is not far from
the President's request.**
These assumptions, however, are to be examined only from the point of
view of Marine Corps appropriations. Their applicability to the other ser-
vices or to the Department of Defense as a whole is not a primary purpose of
this study.
7U.S., The Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Information for Navy
Witnesses Appearing Before Congressional Committees , rev. January 1960, p. 7.
Cited hereafter as Navy Witnesses
.
8Arthur Smithies, The Budgetary Process In the United States (1st ed.,




Since we will be focusing our attention in this paper on but a single
phase of the budget cycle, It may be useful at the beginning to fix this
phase -- legislative authorization -- in relation to the rest of the cycle,
and then to describe it in some detail. Burkhead has developed a format
shown below in Table 1 which illustrates in sufficient detail for our purposes
the phases of the budget cycle. Our interest resides in the second of the
four phases, insofar as appropriations for the Marine Corps result.
TABLE 1





Executive Departments and agencies
Bureau of the Budget
President
Authorization Congress House and Senate and their
appropriations committees
President's veto or signa-
ture







Jesse Burkhead, Government Budget ing (New York: John Wiley Sons, Inc.,
1959), p. 88.

Although the power of the purse was conferred upon Congress by the
Constitution , the budget cycle begins with the preparation and submission
of the budget document by the executive branch. Responsibility for initiating
these expenditure programs was delegated to that branch by the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921. When plannine action has been completed, the
President formally transmits the budget document to the Congress durine
January of each year. The document then represents the President's financial
plan for the fiscal year beginning the next July 1. His action completes the
first phase.
In the second phase, the responsibility rests with Congress to formu-
late the various annual appropriation acts. The one in which we are interested
goes by the short title of "Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 19 ."
It is one of a dozen or so that will be passed during the year to finance the
various functions of government.
Unlike revenue measures, which must be initiated by the House of
Representatives, appropriation measures so far as the Constitution is concerned
may be initiated by either chamber. But traditionally the House retains
12
original jurisdiction over all appropriations. Therefore, when the Presi-
dent's requests are received in Congress, the estimates are parcelled out to
fourteen subcommittees of the fifty-member House Appropriations Committee. In
the case of the Department of Defense request in which we are interested, it
goes to the Defense Subcommittee, composed of fifteen members -- nine from the
10U.S., Constitution , Art. 1, sees. 8 and 9.
1]




9majority and six from the minority party. Thereafter, hearings are held by
the subcommittee in order that it can make recommendations on the action
which Congress should take.
Actually, in order that the appropriations subcommittees (both Senate
and House) nay prepare themselves for the hearings, budget justification books
prepared by the services, reviewed by the Department of Defense and the Bureau
of the Budget, and containing detailed supplementary information not contained
in the budget document, are delivered in advance to Congress. Normally the
subcommittee staffs will have two to three weeks to study the justification
13books before detailed hearings begin.
Thereafter, beginning in late January or, more often, in early February,
the hearings get underway. For convenience in treating with them, we might
group the hearings in which we are interested, that is, those relating to
military personnel, operation and maintenance, and procurement for the Marine
Corps, into three separate and distinct categories:
1. Policy hearings before the Defense Subcommittee of the House
Appropriations Committee
2. Detailed hearings before the Defense Subcommittee of the House
Appropriations Coramittse, and
3. Hearings before the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropria-
tions Committee.
The policy hearings (normally closed to the public) are attended by
some fanfare, resulting largely from the rank and prestige of the witnesses
who come forward in support of the President's budget. A normal sequence of
13





appearance at the policy hearings would be:
1. Department of Defense -- The Secretary of Defense and the Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. Department of the Army -- The Secretary of the Army and the
Chief of Staff of the Army.
3. Department of the Navy -- The Secretary of the Navy, the Chief
of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
4. Department of the Air Force -- The Secretary of the Air Force
and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
Following the policy hearings come the more mundane and detailed
hearings during which the subcommittee carefully reviews the budget estimates
of each service. Each appropriation and budget activity thereunder is
examined, at times in considerable detail. The comptroller of the military
department normally is the first witness. He presents financial statements
and discusses management and fiscal procedures tc be followed in achieving
the objectives established in the budget estimates. Following this, the sub-
committee usually takes up each appropriation in the order of appropriation
titles as they appear in the budget document, that is, "Personnel," "Operation
and Maintenance," "Procurement" and "Research, Development, Test and Evalua-
tion," for each of the services.
Typically, the appropriate civilian assistant secretary of the
Department of the Navy opens the Navy phase of the detailed hearings with a
prepared statement, commenting on the achievements, significant developments
and plans for the coming year in his respective area. Thereafter, hearings
on each major Navy and Marine Corps appropriation are initiated by successive
statements nade by the principal witnesses for, in our case, the Commandant
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of the Marine Corps, on requirements, plans and programs as well as their
execution and financing.
Principal witnesses in support of funds for active duty Marine Corps
personnel are the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l and the Fiscal Officer. In
the case of reserve personnel, they are the Director, Division of Reserve and
the Fiscal Officer. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 and the Fiscal Officer
are the principal witnesses for both the operation and maintenance and the
procurement appropriations. Supporting witnesses may, and usually do,
accompany the principal witnesses in order to provide the necessary detailed,
technical backup.
With regard to the third category of hearings, the Senate subcommittee
may start hearings at any time after the President delivers his budget message.
In theory, it would wait until the House Appropriations Committee had passed
the bill. The Senate would then review the House action pnd presursably act
out its prescribed role as a "court of appeal.** * In practice, however, the
Senate usually begins its hearings before the House has completed its action.
In recent years, this has become increasingly common. Nevertheless, final
action by the Senate will almost always occur after final action by the House.
The Senate Committee on Appropriations is made up of twenty- seven
members, seventeen from the majority and ten from the minority party. The
Department of Defense Subcommittee consists of sixteen, ten from the majority
and sir from the minority party. In addition, the subcommittee is supplemented





Senate Defense Subcommittee hearings are procedurally similar to those
of the House Subcommittee, but are ant to be shorter and are usually open
hearings in contrast to those in the House. Further, the subcommittee action
is very likely to be directed at the differences between appropriations as
requested by the President and the action which the House took (or is contem-
plating, if the House hearings are not completed).
We irlll discuss various aspects of House and Senate hearings from time
to time throughout this study, but in orHor to understand the whole nrocedure
on Defense anpropriation bills, let us first trace the events following the
completion of the House hearings, to which point we now return.
Upon completion of the House hearings, the Defense Subcommittee of the
House Appropriations Committee proposes the Department of Defense Appropriation
Rill. The proposed bill is then referred to the full Appropriations Committee
and upon the Committee's approval, it is reported out to the floor of the
House. After debate on the floor of the House the bill is passed and sent to
the Senate. In like manner, the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropria-
tions Committee recommends e Department of Defense Appropriation Bill to the
full committee; after approval it is reported out to the floor of the Senate
for debate and passage.
It should be noted at this point that in both Senate and House,
the subcommittees, not the Appropriations Committee itself, wield the
influence. The subcommittee marks up the bill, and with the help of
its staff prepares a report. The Appropriations Committee, in turn,
will rarely modify the action of its subcommittee. 16
The Chairman of the subcommittee acts as floor manager for his bill
when it comes up for debate. In the House, general debate is limited and it
1 jBurkhead, op. cit ., p„ 99,
.
13
is unusual for the committee action to be modified substantially. In the
Senate, floor discussion is likely to be more extensive because of the
privilege of free debate. Modifications are more frequent on the Senate floor
than in the House. '
In order to reconcile the differences contained in the separate bills
which have been passed, each body appoints certain of its members (drawing on
subcommittee membership) to work with the other in Joint Conference to adjust
the differences. Assuming that the report of this group is accepted by both
House and Senate -- and it usually is -- the bill as finally approved is
enrolled, signed by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate
and transmitted to the President for approval or veto. Appropriations measures,
however, are rarely vetoed. When approved or otherwise effective, the bill
becomes an Act of Congress and is assigned a Public Law number by which it may
thereafter be designated. Thus, phase two of the budget cycle is completed.
Although it is not the purpose of this paper to critique the procedures
followed by Congress in moving appropriation measures through the system, it
seems useful to note at this point that the procedures just outlined leave
much to be desired in both theory and practice. Before considering the
problems which confront military witnesses who appear at hearings in support
of appropriations, some consideration of the problems inherent in the entire
congressional appropriation system itself appear to be in order. An apprecia-
tion of the larger problems involved will account, in some measure at least,
for the apparent frustrations, fixations on detail and irrelevant interest or





The rather lengthy quotation which follows resulted from independent
research conducted by Professor Arthur Smithies, Chairman, Department of
Economics, Harvard University. Dr. Smithies, who was working under a grant
from the Committee for Economic Development, and who completed, in 1955, his
study of the processes by which expenditure decisions are reached, made these
observations about congressional actions involved.
The President's Budget Message is read to the Congress early in each
session, but it is not debated or referred to in committee proceedings.
Neither is there formal congressional debate on the budget as a whole.
Nor is there any real consideration of it by the full appropriations
committees or by either House....
The work on the budget continues to be done by the powerful appropria-
tions subcommittees which deal with particular departments or groups of
departments and prepare separate appropriation bills covering their
several assignments. And the only way that the congressman or the pri-
vate citizen can attempt to understand what the budget proposes is to
read the House subcommittee hearings.... To comprehend any program it
is, of course, necessary to read the hearings for more than one year.
Each subcommittee member has the right to question each department
witness, and the questioning frequently fluctuates violently from basic
policy Issues to the most trivial detail. After the opening statements
by the department heads, which in some instances are highly illuminating,
the hearings frequently become chaotic. Practically everything one wants
to know can be found somewhere, but to uncover it is a major research
project that requires much more time than is available to even the most
conscientious congressman....
The only members of the House who really have a chance to understand
a particular program are the half-dozen subcommittee members who sit
through the hearings, and their comprehension varies with the nature of
the programs they consider.... It is difficult for anyone, including
subcommittee members to acquire a professional view of the defense pro-
gram. These remarks are not intended to reflect on the ability and
diligence of the members or the departmental witnesses. They are
intended to reflect on a system that requires the expenditure of vast
amounts of effort for minimum returns in terms of public information.
Despite the great improvements that have been made in the presentation
and the consideration of the budget during the past decade, present
Congressional procedures are a most serious barrier to real public
comprehension of the budget.
Bills are considered in the full House Appropriations Committee for
only about an hour or so and they are usually sent unchanged to the floor
of the House. Since the several appropriations bills are considered
separately, floor debate is normally restricted to particular appropriation
questions on which most members are uninformed. Only occasionally does
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an individual member take the opportunity to reflect on the state of
the budget as a whole. Such observations usually occur in the Senate
rather than the House.... Event hen the bills serve as a soundin^
board for an individual and rarely produce Congressional debate and
far less Congressional decision on general budgetary policy. The whole
process leads to frustration and cynicism on the part of members of
Congress who are not directly involved in the appropriations process;
even those who are involved feel that the massive hearings do not
provide them with an adequate basis for judgment.
The proposals of the House Committee are then reviewed by the Senate
appropriations subcommittees, which act primarily as courts of appeal
for the departments against the House action. Consequently the main
substantive consideration of the President's budget takes place in the
House. The House is normally unwilling to appropriate in excess of
the Budget Bureau estimates. The Senate is less unwilling in this
respect and sometimes actively resents what it regards as the Budget
Bureau's intrusion on the legislative process. In both Houses there
is considerable uneasiness about Budget Bureau action. Witnesses are
frequently asked to give their original requests to the Budget Bureau
and have been considered unresponsive when they refuse. In the defense
hearings in recent years the original departmental estimates have
usually been discussed. And in 1949 the Congress appropriated for a
seventy-group Air Force despite the active opposition of the President.
The Congress has by no means acquiesced in the view that the President
should be the only spokesman for the Executive Branch or that depart-
ment heads should abide loyally by his decisions. 18
I Q10Smithies, op. cit .. pp. 133-36.

CHAPTER III
THE CARE AND FEEDING OF WITNESSES
Having looked at the procedures by which an appropriation bill is
moved through the Congress, let us now examine in somewhat more detail the
conduct of hearings by the appropriations subcommittees. Our purpose in doing
so will be to gain some insights into the impact which this phase has on the
final outcome of the bill. Thus, we will have some basis on which to arrive
at conclusions as to the first assumption being tested -- that the amount of
19funds appropriated by Congress relates directly to the ability of witnesses.
The approach in this chapter will be to examine, first, the advice and in-
structions which are applicable to witnesses; next, the subcommittee membership;
and, finally, the conduct of recent hearings.
There is certainly no lack of guidance for an officer who is faced
with the necessity of preparing himself to appear at a congressional hearing.
As a matter of convenience in considering this guidance we may divide the
material into two types: that which is non-directive in nature and that which
is directive. Both types are very useful.
Considering first the former type, it may be said that some of the
very best guidance is to be found here. One source, for instance, is the
service magazine or journal. From time to time, articles will appear which
provide valuable advice ranging from the "how-to-do- it" type to the background
information type. 2t; A particularly pertinent article appeared a few years
Supra
, p. 6.
20Examples of these might be, respectively: (1) W. A. McGuiness,
"Advice to Witness ~~ Testifyin- before Congressional Committees," The JAG
Journal (Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, Washington, D.C.),
February, 1954, p. 9; lad (2) Tnhn n. . 'Mnndford, "It's Your ">n-->ress," United
States Naval Institute Proceedings
.





Ago written by an author unusually well qualified to advise in this area. l
He is Lieutenant Colonel John R. Blandford, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, a
lawyer who saw active duty with the 1st Marine Division in the Pacific during
World War II. After release from active duty and since January, 1947, he has
been counsel for the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives*
Having seen any number of military witnesses, he observes:
There are a few guiding principles which should be the commandments
for every Service witness. Fir6t, the witness should learn the simple
phrase "I am sorry I do not know the answer to that question." If he
believes it is possible to obtain the information, he should so advise
the Committee and then obtain the information. .. .Members of Congress
ask questions for their own guidance and in order to form an opinion
as to the necessity for legislation. The questions that they ask, no
matter how unrelated they may appear to be to the subject matter, are
askod for a reason and they should be answered. Oftentimes seemingly
unrelated questions may be asked as a foundation for future questioning,
or they may reflect particular problems that have been brought to the
attention of a member by a constituent. Such questions should not be
disregarded.
Secondly, the Service witness should assiduously avoid the incom-
plete answer, or more bluntly stated, the half truth. The other half
will eventually come to light and it may prove embarrassing to the
witness who has given only a partial reply.
Third, the witness must remember that he is in a. forum where his
decorum and demeanor will be under constant observation. Courtesy,
respect, and an even temperament are cardinal requirements. And here
should appear the motto for every Service witness: "Never underestimate
a Congressman." There is, though infrequently, a tendency on the part
of a few witnesses to brush off or treat lightly the questions asked
by committee counsel or freshman congressmen. The committee counsel are
selected by the committee and are acting for the committee. They are
entitled to the same respect accorded to the committee as a whole. And
Congressmen don't often get elected to office without having a pretty
keen insight into human nature. A pretty good rule to follow for any-
one appearing before a Congressional committee is that its members,
singly and collectively, are brighter than the witness. A witness who
appears before a Congressional committee should be prepared to answer
all types of questions which may be asked or else state that he does
not know the answer. Answers such as "I don't think that has anything
to do with the bill under consideration," or "I've already answered
that question" may be all right at a staff conference in the Pentagon,
21\John R. Blandford, "Testifying Before Congressional Committees,"
United States Naval Institute Proceedings
. March, 1955, p. 295.
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but they are not appropriate replies to questions posed by committee
members or committee counsel. The effectiveness of a witness who so
answers a question is reduced in geometric proportion to his failure
to respond properly.
And finally, a Service witness should be completely honest. The
old cliche that it is easier to tell the truth because you don't have
to remember what you said is never more appropriate than in the field
of Congressional inquiry.
In fact, the most important requirements for an effective witness
before a Congressional committee are honesty and information. It will
be noted that honesty is emphasized ahead of information. There is
reason for this. While it may sound anomalous, it is none the less so,
that a witness who by his demeanor makes it fully evident that what he
is telling the committee is true has persuasiveness that no amount of
information from a witness, who is otherwise, can overcome. Congress-
men are people. They are affected and make judgements on the same
basis as any reasonable and intelligent person does. It is for this
reason that an honest answer, which may, when necessary, include "I
don't know" can go further toward insuring favorable consideration of
a measure than any amount of information where the complexion of forth-
rightness is lacking. By the foregoing it is not intended in any way
to minimize the importance of a witness being well informed. That the
witness is well informed, however, should be a matter of gratuitous
assumption. That a witness is wholly honest is unhappily not always
the subject of such an assumption. And here again the partial answer
can be properly interpreted as a half-truth. 22
Another source of general information in the non-directive category is
the legislative liaison office. The Department of Defense and each of the
three military departments has its own legislative liaison office. The Office
of Legislative Afieirs of the Department of the Navy is organized within the
Executive Office of the Secretary of the Navy, headed by a rear admiral, and
located in the Pentagon. In addition, the Commandant of the Marine Corps
maintains in his immediate staff offices a "Legislative Assistant", who at
present is a brigadier general. It is, in brief, the function of these offices
to maintain files of useful and pertinent information in the area of congres-




information concerning appropriation matters, however, one turns within the
Department of the Navy to the Assistant Comptroller, Office of Budgets and
Reports or at the Headquarters, Marine Corps to the Fiscal Director. These
latter offices maintain all the backup information and directives, of course,
but are mentioned at this point because many, if not most, of the officers
who are assigned to these offices also have attended hearings as either prin-
cipal or supporting witnesses. Furthermore, these officers have attended
numerous planning and rehearsal type conferences on the budget, starting at
the service level and progressing through the Department of Defense, Bureau
of the Budget and, finally, the congressional committee staffs themselves.
From them, considerable vicarious experience is available.
The difficulty in learning from this type of experience, however, is
that the experience related is subjective in nature. Therefore, the aspiring
witness is apt to learn more about how the individual viewed his experience
and less about what actually took place than he would have liked. There is,
however, a simple remedy to this problem, which is by way of introduction to
the third and, in my view, the best source of non-directive information -- the
hearings themselves.
It would be ideal if an officer could attend hearings just to observe
in advance of his ha\'ing to appear as a witness. Unfortunately, there are
obstacles to such a procedure aside from the fact than an officer may not have
been stationed in Washington in advance of the time he must appear. Even if
stationed there, his duties may prevent him from so observing (though, having
done some observing myself, I would think this not a very good excuse for
passing up a marvelous opportunity). The real difficulty is that in the case




therefore they are not open to the public. While Senate hearings are
normally open hearings, it has already been established that they are not so
24
thorough as House hearings. They, therefore, are not as instructive, but
certainly not to be by- passed on that score.
But, even accepting these obstacles, the printed hearings are available
or can be obtained through most large libraries. And here is a gold mine of
objective information as to vhat it's like to be a witness. It is not un-
usual for bound editions of a single year's hearings to occupy more than a
foot of library shelf space. The 1961 Senate hearings, for Instance, were In
two parts consisting of almost 1900 pages, while the House hearings were in
seven parts of almost 4200 pages. Not that one must read It all! Each part is
indexed and contains a list of witnesses by name, citing the appropriate page
numbers. One may, therefore, be selective as to the areas to be studied.
It probably ought to be noted that the printed hearings do not
necessarily represent verbatim transcripts. Although recorded by stenographers,
the hearings are subsequently reviewed, edited and, in some cases, revised
before printing, in the same manner as is the Congressional Record . Nonethe-
less, the 'flavor" of the hearings remains for those who may be interested in
savoring it.
So much for the non-directive sources of advice and instruction for
witnesses. Let us turn our attention now to the directives.
As one would expect, the directives are more specific and technical
than the non-directive sources we have been discussing. They are apt to quote
passages of the United States Code , or Bureau of the Budget Circulars, or Navy
Regulations , or perhaps all three. In order to limit somewhat this rather





broad area I shall confine my remarks to the single directive published within
the Headquarters, Marine Corps, early this year by the Fiscal Director for the
guidance of those having to testify on appropriations. 2 * It was a half-page
directive which referred the reader to other appropriation publications,
namely, one from the Secretary of Defense, one from the Secretary of the Navy,
one from the Comptroller of the Navy, and, perhaps most useful of all, a
pamphlet prepared by the Office of the Secretary of the Navy entitled Informa-
tion for Navy Witnesses Appearing Before Congressional Committees
.
Secretary of Defense McNamara's memorandum of two pages, issued shortly
after he took office, merely reaffirmed existing policy and procedures insofar
as testimony on the President's budget is concerned and directed compliance
with appropriate Bureau of the Budget guidance, parts of which were quoted as
follows:
It is understandable that officials and employees will feel strongly
about the importance of their own agency's work, and will sometimes be-
lieve that a larger budget might be in order. Such feelings, however,
must be related to an awareness that our budget resources are not adequate
to accommodate in any one year all of the things that might be desired.
The President is responsible for reviewing the total needs of the execu-
tive branch in the light of tax and debt policy and for deciding among
competing requests for priorities. Executive branch personnel are
expected to support the President in his budget recommendations.
As you and your staff prepare to justify your portion of the budget
before Congress, you will want to observe the requirements set forth at
the President's direction in Bureau of the Budget Circular No. A-IO. It
is expected that witnesses will carefully avoid volunteering views
differing from the budget, either on the record or off the record. T Jhile
direct questions at hearings must be answered frankly, it is expected that
a witness who feels that he must set forth a personal view inconsistent
with the President's budget will also point out that the President's
judgement on the matter was reached from his overall perspective as the
head of the Government, and in the light of overriding national policy.
The witness should make it clear that his personal comments are not to
25
•^Memorandum from Fiscal Director of the Marine Corps to Distribution
List, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, AS/crk dated 12 January, 1962; Subject:




be construed as a request for additional funds.
Secretary of the Navy Connelly's memorandum, equally brief and in the
vein, enjoined all of the addressees to 'thoroughly familiarize" them-
selves with current policy so that testimony would be "consistently in con-
formance" with it, stating in part:
The budget, as presented to the Congress represents the optimum
balance between the need for funds and the availability of funds. The
allocation of the available funds is of the nature of a compromise since
every requirement cannot be satisfied and still assure National exonomic
solvency. This compromise is a reasoned one, tempered with the most
judicious consideration of all factors introduced during the lengthy
budget review process. Individuals cannot voluntarily depart in their
testimony from support of this budget and its underlying concepts with-
out distorting the proper perspective in which the budget, as a whole
has been conceived and must be reviewed. Championing of special causes
by individuals invariably results in warping the budget structure since
the budget results from a chain of related decisions which should not
be viewed out of context with each other. 27
The Comptroller of the Navy goes into considerably more detail in his
op
memorandum in providing instructions and information for witnesses. Tut
for our purposes, we can restrict our attention to the "General Reminders for
Witnesses" before the committees, excerpts of which follow:
1. The Committee works from the President's Budget Message and the
justification books. Be well acquainted with both.
2. Criticism or implied criticism of actions of OSD and the 3ureau
of the Budget is to be avoided. Matters on which you may have strong
opinions, in particular, must be treated factually, with well-considered
words, to avoid misinterpretation by the Committee. Evasiveness, however,
should not be construed as discretion.
26Meraorandura from the Secretary of Defense for the Secretary of the
Army, the Secretary of the Navy et al
.
, dated March 22, 1961; Subject: Testi-
mony on the President's Program.
^Memorandum from the Secretary of the Navy for the Distribution List,
dated 7 April, 1961} Subject: Testimony Before Congressional Committees.
28Memorandum from the Comptroller of the Navy to the Distribution List,
NAVCOMPT INSTRUCTION 7120.21, dated 18 January, 1961; Subject: Department of
the Navy FY 1962 budget hearings before the Congressional Appropriations
Committees, information for witnesses.

23
3. ... Thorough familiarity with the (accepted, official Navy
Budget figures} and their derivations is essential. Figures which
cannot be reconciled... should not be quoted. Similarly, you should
be familiar with the Navy financial plan as it applies to your appro-
priations for the current fiscal year.
4. Review the record of last year's hearings on your appropriation
so that, if asked, you can explain deviations from plans outlined at
that time and be able to give the current status of items of continuing
interest. Also review the Committee Report on last year's hearings and
be ready to speak on any comments which might have been directed at
your bureau or office....
5. It is the responsibility of the activities concerned to provide
appropriate witnesses to insure satisfactory justification of programs
and estimates, but every effort must be made to hold the number of
supporting witnesses to a minimum.... Well-briefed principal witnesses,
assisted by we 11 -documented backup books, should serve to reduce the
number of supporting witnesses actually required. The Committee prefers
to receive the answers to its questions in the hearing room, if possible.
However, if you do not have the data on hand, it is proper to offer to
supply the material for the record.
6. Occasionally, a question answered earlier in the proceedings may
be repeated by another member, or a question may be asked which appears
to be well answered in the justification book. In any case, answer the
question as it is asked; do not look for hidden meanings. Not all the
members are present at all times in the hearing room, nor should it be
assumed that all the members have had the opportunity to examine .the
justification books in detail.
7. The courtesy, accuracy and integrity of the witness represent to
the Committee the integrity of the Navy and of the budget estimate under
consideration. Principal witnesses, in particular, must be well acquainted
with the budget estimates which they are justifying, and with the plans
and programs supported by the budget. -'
It may be seen from all of the foregoing information, then, that a
fairly definitive "code of conduct" exists which is designed to govern and
guide witnesses before congressional committees. Bringing all of this guidance
together into a single publication was accomplished several years ago when the
office of the Secretary of the Navy distributed the pamphlet Information for









All of the advice noted before and much additional useful information is
included in this work.
Certainly, with all of the foregoing sources of information, advice,
counsel and instruction in mind, the prospective witness can have a pretty
fair idea of how he should behave and of what will be expected of him. Yet,
if we are really to appreciate the significance of this hearing process, we
must first learn more about those sitting across the table from the witness.
So now let us turn our attention to the congressional subcommittee members.
It is difficult to know where to begin in an attempt to gain insight
into politics and politicians. I personally am of the opinion that the field
is so complex and so interwoven with subtleties, that almost any list of
"sources" is bound from its inception to be totally inadequate. like any
other complex field, so much depends on prior knowledge. Therefore, if one
is not well read in American history or does not read and observe current
politics and government, it is almost hopeless to attempt to jump into the
middle of the subject and expect to have it make much sense.
Nonetheless, for our part, we are not trying to comprehend the total
system, though that would be helpful, not to say admirable. We can narrow
down our attempt to just the appropriation subcommittees themselves since we
already have an indication that it is there that the real power resides. *
And we already possess some generalized information from the various sources
already quoted. But, where do we turn for specific information on the sub-
committees and their staffs?
One standard source of information is the Congressional Directory , an
31 Sup_ra, p. 12,
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official publication revised annually for each new session of Congress. 32
The first 190 pages of this book are devoted to biographical sketches of the
members of Congress 'based on information furnished or authorized by the
respective Senators and Representatives.' 33
But these biographies are not always helpful. For instance, if we
wished to find out something about the Chairman of the House Appropriations
Committee from this source we would find only:
CLARENCE CANNON, Democrat, born April 11, 1879; married and has two
daughters; elected to the 63th and succeeding Congresses; address:
Elsberry, Mo., R.F.D. I. 34
We would find even less about the senior Senator from Maine, who sits
as a member of the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. The biographi-
cal entry states cryptically "MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Republican. 35 At least
Senator Russell of the same subcommittee saw fit to add "of Winder, Ga." after
his name and party affiliation.
These are, to be sure, exceptions. A more complete and typical entry
may be found for the Chairman of the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee:
DENNIS CHAVEZ, Democrat, of Albuquerque, N. Hex., born at Los Chavez,
Valencia County, N. Mex., April 8, 1338; attended public schools of
Albuquerque; graduate of law school, Georgetown University, 1920, with
LL.B. degree; married Iraelda Espinosa, November 9, 1911; has three
children •* Dennis ohavez, Jr., Mrs. George Dixon, and Mrs. Jorge
Tristani; served as clerk of the United States Senate, 1918 to 1920;
member of New Mexico Legislature; practiced law at Albuquerque; elected
32U.S., Congress, Congressional Directory: 87th Congress
f
2d Session







to the 72d Congress; reelected to the 73d Congress; appointed to the
United States Senate by Gov. Clyde Tingley on May 11, 1935; elected
November 3, 1936; reelected November 5, 1940; reelected November 5,
1946; reelected November 4, 1952; reelected November 4, 1958. -*?
Even so, this is not the kind of information we need about subcommittee
members.
Here is an area where the legislative liaison people can be very help-
ful, for in addition to other files, they compile information on the legisla-
tive interests of, and the position taken by, individual congressmen on matters
affecting the Department of Defense. Information compiled with such a purpose
in mind can be infinitely more helpful than the biographies from the Congres -
sional Directory . To illustrate, the following information on Senator Chavez
is available from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Legislative
Affairs:
Legislative Interests :
Continuing interest in military retirement, retired pay considerations
and post retirement conflict-of-interest question.
Suggested on floor the creation of numerous space and other research
agencies is causing difficulty in determining who is making DOD policy
on vital issues.
Considers elimination of military personnel shifts a desirable
economy measure.
Supports large modern Navy including aircraft carriers.
Has stated that because of dispersal the National Guards may be our
most important military force following nuclear attack.
Advocates closer control of DOD contracting procedures with added
emphasis on competitive bidding. Believes small business not getting
fair share of contracts.
Supports Air-Alert concept, B-70 and ANP programs; supports increased
air-lift including long range jet transports.
Objected on floor (16 Jan 60) to executive "freezing of funds"
appropriated for Defense Dept. by Congress. 3 **
Similar information is available on all of the other committee members.
37Ibid.
, p. 98.
38Memorandum entitled "SENATOR DENNIS CHAVEZ (Democrat - New Mexico)"
dated February 12, 1962, from files maintained by Special Assistant to the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs).
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But, in my opinion, even better Information is available from the
records of the hearings and from the records of debate on the floor. It is
again a problem of the subjective information which someone else has compiled
versus one's own assessment of what is significant (which may or may not, but
hopefully will, be objective). Thus from the Legislative Affairs summary on
Representative Daniel J. Flood (Democrat - Pennsylvania) there is no indication
that he is partisan toward the Marine Corps, yet one knows this immediately
from reading the hearing or the Congressional Record . Likewise, from the
Congressional Record we can glean the fact that both Senators Chaves and
Saltonstall have sons who served in the Marine Corps. While one should not
become overly complacent about the net effects of piecing together bits of
information, still it seems evident that the more that is known about the
committee members and their staffs, the better the witness will be able to
perform creditably.
Certainly one fact which should not be overlooked is that, by and
large, the committee members will have had far more experience in dealing with
annual appropriations than will have had the average witness. "Don't under*
estimate the ability and knowledge of the interrogator" advises the Navy
pamphlet. In view of the length of service of the congressmen on the sub-
committees, this is excellent advice. Currently five of the six ranking
members of the Senate are on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee; while
41
only one subcommittee member has fawer than ten years service in the Senate.
3vU.S., Congressional Record , 86th Cong., 2d Sess., i960, CVI, Part 10,
p. 12842.
*°Navy Witnesses, op. cit . , p. 20.
^•Congressional Directory, op. cit ., pp. 216-17. The senators referred
to (with rank) are: Senators Hayden (1), Russell (2), Chavez (4), Ellender (5)
and Hill (6); the junior subcommittee member, Senator Allott (R.-Colo.) has been
a senator since 1955.
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Much the same experience level exists among the House members of the Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee. Mr. Mahon (Democrat - Texas), the ranking member
and chairman, is now in his fourteenth consecutive term as a representative.
The junior member has served for four consecutive terms in Congress. Average
number of terms of service is more than eight.
^
2
One of the sacrifices to fiscal reform made in the Marine Corps as the
result of the National Security Act Amendment of 1949, was the transfer of
appropriation functions from the Quartermaster General to the newly established
Fiscal Branch. 3 At that time, and for a decade prior, the Quartermaster
General was Major General William P. T. Hill, U.S. Marine Corps. He had been
appearing before Congress year after year to support the Marine Corps' require-
ments for appropriations. He knew Marine Corps requirements and the congress-
men, and the congressmen knew, trusted and respected General Hill. It was a
very satisfactory relationship nurtured over a period of years. Now, however,
it would be exceptional for an officer to have more than a few years' ex-
perience because of rotation of duty assignments. Considering the experience
most congressmen have, this places the witness at a comparative disadvantage.^
Should a witness happen to overlook this disparity in appropriation
experience, the congressmen have on occasion seen fit to remind the witness of
42Ibid., pp. 219-26.
^Major E. A. Wilcox et al . "Financial Management in the Marine Corps:
An Evaluation" (group research project, Navy Graduate Financial Management
Program, George Washington University, 1962), p. 12.
A notable exception to this generalization is the case of the present
Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David M. Shoup, who had the advantage
of being the Marine Corps' first Fiscal Director in 1953, and who therefore
went before the subcommittees as Commandant in I960, and subsequent years with
considerably more background than most officers would be able to acquire.

29
the facts. Nor do the congressmen much admire the executive branch ignoring
congressional advice in Defense appropriation matters. During floor debate on
the 1961 appropriations, then Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson (Democrat - Texas)
said
I hope that the executive branch will recognize that the increases
provided by the Congress in this appropriation bill represent a careful
and conscientious effort to strengthen our most vital programs. 1 cer-
tainly hope that the executive branch will not let some budget clerks
willfully disregard the expressed intent of the Congress.^
Not only should the subcommittee members' ability and knowledge be
recognized, so should the staffs'. Mr. Cannon, during debate on the floor of
the House on the fiscal year 1963 defense appropriations, provides us with
some insight into staff qualifications.
Of the 50 members of the staff accredited to the Committee on
Appropriations, I have appointed all but 6.... None of them are from
my congressional district, or from my own State. 1 have never exer-
cised personal political preference in the appointment of any of them.
... the staff of the Committee on Appropriations is permanent. It
is made up of careermen who serve for life. Special qualifications are
required and we have our own system of civil service. For example,
former service in some budgetary capacity in a Federal department is one
of the requirements. In order to know how to tear down a budget the
clerk must have had experience in building up a budget. There are other
requirements, of course, that are essential. In selecting the last
addition to the staff something like 200 men were screened -- without
their knowledge, of course -- before we reached the men we took.
Incident ly, no one who applies for a position is ever appointed.
We do not have room for a man who is looking for a job. We can use only
men who are so efficient and so well located that they have no desire
for a change; and any man who makes application to us for one of these
jobs thereby automatically eliminates himself from consideration.
... the men we ... use must assist in the distribution ... of hundreds
of millions of dollars in every department of governmental activity.
They have highly responsible duties; they must be technical, scholarly,
objectively minded men and, of course, men of immaculate integrity. "
^5U.S., Congressional Record , 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1960, CVI, Part 11,
p. 15100.
U.S., Congressional Record , 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1962, CVIII, No. 59,
p. 6319-20. (Note: this reference is to the daily, unbound Record ; pagination
will change in the permanent bound edition.)
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So far we have examined the appropriation process from the point of
view of the witness and from that of the subcommittees. In the final part of
this chapter, we shall see what we might learn from what happens when the one
confronts the other. Again we shall use the records of hearings and floor
debate to get some measure of the results.
From reading of numerous records of hearings, both Senate and House,
scanning others, and attending a few, certain impressions come immediately to
mind. First and foremost of these is that the subcommittees, in general, treat
the witnesses with great kindness and consideration. And second, I have the
distinct impression that the Marine Corps is treated in terms of cordiality
with somewhat more deference than are the other services. This seems true in
both houses. For instance, the Commandant's testimony before the Senate sub-
committee a few years ago closed on this note:
Senator CHAVEZ. Gentlemen, of the different services, and they are
all highly respected, I think we have fine services, fine Army, fine
Navy, and fine Air Force, but the Marine Corps is the one that stands
out with the American people. I know. I think they deserve that
standing.
General SHOUT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator DWORSHAK. I concur in the Chairman's remarks.
Earlier this year in opening the House hearings on Department of the
Navy budget estimates, Mr. Mahon, Chairman of the Subcommittee, warmly wel-
comed Secretary of the Navy Korth and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral
Anderson. But then in the next breath he made the previous welcome seem almost
perfunctory by comparison when he said to Mr. Korth:
We will hear your statement, and then Admiral Anderson's statement
which will be followed by a statement by General Shoup. The Marines
always seem to get top priority in this committee and in Congress. You
are always very welcome. You are people of few words, but your words
U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropria-
tions, Hearings on H.R. 11998, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961
,
36th Cong., 2d Sess., I960, p. 181. Cited hereafter as Hearings on H.R. 11998 .
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are always good and your actions are always better than your words, so
we are glad to have you before us again. ^°
A third general impression is that the hearings follow the same
pattern service by service, year after year. First, there is the opening
statement. Then the subcommittee members ask questions about points which
are of interest to them. Generally the opening statement by the Commandant
is not too long and attempts to do two things •• give an overview of what it
is the Marine Corps will be able to do with the resources planned in the
budget under consideration, and assure the subcommittee that the resources
provided will be capably and efficiently managed with maximum economy and
minimum waste. The words change, but the assurance is there year after year.
... in the hearings before this committee last year I described the
measures taken to administer the affairs of the Marine Corps economic-
ally. 1 pointed out some of the steps which we had taken to cause a
reduction in the expense of maintaining the Marine Corps. The program
of economy has been continued with increasing intensity until the present
time. As no great result can be attained without cooperation, we have
endeavored in every way practicable to educate public opinion within the
Marine Corps and to instill into the minds of officers and men the vital
necessity of preventing waste and the great importance of putting our
corps on an economical basis.
^
This testimony could have been given by almost any Commandant, but was in fact
given forty years ago when Major General John A. LeJeune accompanied Assistant
Secretary of the Navy Colonel Theodore Roosevelt up to the Hill to testify on
the Marine Corps appropriation for fiscal year 1923. As an interesting side-
light, one of General Lejeune's backup witnesses at this hearing was Captain
L. C. Shepherd, himself to become Commandant in 1952. Here, then, is another
48U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropria-
tions, Hearings on Department of Defense Appropriations for 1963 , 87th Cong.,
2d Sess., 1962, Part 2, p. 367.
^9U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropria-
tions, Hearings on Navy Department Appropriation Bill, 1923 , 67th Cong., 2d
Session, 1922, p. 633.
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case where a Commandant had an opportunity to become familiar with the tech-
nique of hearings before having to be a principal witness himself.
A fourth impression is that General Shoup handles himself particularly
well before the subcommittees. He does this by following the guidelines laid
down. While his prepared statements are usually straightforward in their
approach, his response to direct questions tends at times to be "salty" -- and
the congressmen seem to enjoy it. He likes to use phrases such as "more bang
for a buck'" to describe improvements in firepower. To justify the size of his
headquarters staff in terms of the load of paperwork involved, he describes
the headquarters as "understaffed and overstuffed." This latter remark
prompted Senator Chavez to encourage him by saying, "You are talking like a
Marine now. Go ahead." Last year one of his adroit alliterations was even
picked up by the House subcommittee and used by it in its report to the House
on the bill. In justifying appropriations for Navy shipbuilding, the report
stated that:
... one of the primary needs appears to be for more ships, adapted
to large troop movements accompanied by the necessary supporting equip-
ment and supplies.
No one could more graphically describe the situation than the
Commandant of the Marine Corps did when he said:
"... we have more fight than we can ferry. "51
In addition to the Commandant's testimony, Marine witnesses testify
in each of three areas: personnel, operation and maintenance, and procurement.
These witnesses also follow the guidelines. A review of their testimony over
the last few years leads to a fifth general impression -- that it has gone
relatively smoothly. Even when an outright administrative error was made a
50Hearings on H.R. 11998, op. cit .. p. 1723.
U.S., Congress, House, House of Representatives Report No. 574 to
Accompany H.R. 7851 , 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, p. 12.
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few years ago and Brigadier General Herman Nickerson, Fiscal Director, was
in the uncomfortable position of having to explain how certain costs were
incorrectly assembled by object classification in the Justification books,
the Senate Subcommittee was sympathetic and, no doubt with some amusement,
52
merely expressed surprise "that the Marines could make an error."
Most often the witnesses are complimented at the conclusion of their
testimony. While this is often merely a matter of routine courtesy, after
seeing the way great numbers of witnesses are handled (and as many as 20C may
appear before a subcommittee during the course of one year's hearings), one
can often detect what is merely routine and what is heartfelt. It is my
impression that the compliments to Marine witnesses are for the most part
sincere. Certainly there is no mistaking a comment such as Mr. Flood made
during hearings on Marine Corps procurement funds a few years ago when he
said to a Marine backup witness: "As a technical backup man, you are about
CO
the best I have heard this year from any branch of the service."
This is not to say that two different congressmen at the same hearings
will view a witness* performance in the same light. For instance, this year
at Senate hearings Rear Admiral J. S. McCain, Jr. gave an absolutely out-
standing forty minute illustrated presentation entitled "The New Four Ocean
Seapower Challenge." Following the presentation (during which the subcommittee
members came and went at will), the Acting Subcommittee Chairman Senator A.
Willis Robertson (Democrat - Virginia) was so impressed that he suggested
Admiral McCain ought to carry the message to the entire country by presentation
52Hearings on H.R. 11998, op. cit . t p. 1750.
"U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropria-
tions, Hearings on Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961 , 86th Cong.,
2d Sess., 1960, Part 5, p. 179.

34
during prime time on a national television network. The Chairman complimented
him over and over again for his sterling performance. Senator Henry C.
Dworshak (Republican - Idaho), on the other hand, rather laconically observed
that, if the matter was as important as indicated, Admiral McCain would do
better to carry his message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nevertheless, in
the case of Marine witnesses during the past few years, my impression is that
they have been warmly received and well treated in both Houses and that the
witnesses have performed well.
Tinally, one other impression comes through strongly from studying
the hearings. It is that the subcommittee members have an insatiable appetite
for details in connection with the appropriations. It would be a challenge
to turn to the records of any hearings and not find numerous illustrations of
this phenomenon. It is as true for Marine witnesses as for any others. Dr.
Smithies, having analyzed this aspect of appropriation hearings, suggests that
there is a perfectly reasonable explanation for this behavior:
In many instances the Congress seeks refuge in preoccupation with
detail and ignores or avoids consideration of the major policy issues
raised by the budget. This tendency seems to be not merely a Con-
gressional characteristic but a characteristic of human behavior in
general. The larger issues are usually the most difficult to grasp
and frequently the most unpleasant to confront. The temptation is
strong to neglect the main issue and consider detail that is meaning-
less except in the context of the larger issue. Or one finds the
problem incomprehensible as a whole and attempts to gain comprehension
of the whole through summation of knowledge about the parts •• fre-
quently with indifferent success. Knowledge of the individual stones
is unlikely to show how the Pyramids were built, and knowledge of the
individual tactical units of an army is unlikely to add up to a foreign
policy.
Such tendencies are particularly noticeable in consideration of the
defense budget. With a sigh of relief the committee member, who is as
baffled as everyone else about the meaning of national security, finds
54Personal observation at Senate Defense Appropriation Subcommittee
hearings on March 29, 1962.
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an item such as "research on secretarial chairs" and goes to work on it
to the tune of several pages of hearings. 55
While Dr. Smithies' explanation is no doubt a good one, I am not sure
that awareness of it would make a witness feel any better about his already
hopeless task of attempting to anticipate every inquiry which will be directed
to him by the subcommittee members.
In this chapter, we have attempted to gain some appreciation of the
hearing process as it affects Marine Corps appropriation measures. We have
seen that there is a carefully worked out code of conduct for witnesses and
that Marine witnesses have comported themselves very well by following this
guidance. The relationships, therefore, between the subcommittees and the
Marine Corps are excellent. Presumably, then, because the witnesses do so
well, Marine Corps requests are favorably acted upon by the subcommittees and --
since that s where the greatest influence is -- by both Houses of Congress. In
the next chapter, we shall undertake an examination of the course which Marine
Corps appropriations have followed in recent years through Congress.




CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON MARINE CORPS APPROPRIATIONS
The course an appropriation bill follows through Congress was traced
in detail in Chapter II. This chapter traces through the actions which the
Congress has actually taken in terms of actual dollar amounts during the last
five years. Again, we will be dealing, insofar as Marine Corps appropriations
are concerned, only with those categories which are directly designated for the
Marine Corps and for which the Marine Corps must justify its requirements before
Congress; that is, military personnel, reserve personnel, operation and main-
tenance, and procurement. While we know that some Marine Corps funds are
included in other Navy appropriations, since we cannot break out these amounts
without detailed analysis and knowledge of the Navy appropriations structure,
we shall concern ourselves only with the four categories just mentioned. These
will be adequate for this analysis.
Probably the easiest way to visualize congressional action in this
area during recent years is to reduce the figures to tabular form so that they
may be compared as successive actions were taken. This is what has been done
in Table 2 on pages 37 and 38. Only funds representing new obligational
authority are shown. Transfers of funds from the Marine Corps Stock Fund
occurred in the last four years, but these amounts are not included in Table 2.
Some mention probably ought to be made in explanation of the procurement
appropriation for fiscal year 1958. It may be seen from the Table that although
a sum of $100 million was included in the budget, no money was actually
appropriated. This was because Congress took note of the large unobligated
balances remaining in procurement funds and wished the Marine Corps to work off
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while having a sizeable effect upon the total dollar amount, had practically
no effect on the operations of the Marine Corps during the year in question.
It may also be noted that in each of the five years, the Congress
accepted precisely the amounts recommended by the Joint Conference . A better
appreciation of the manner in which Marine appropriations have fared during
these years may be gained by studying Table 3. This table shows the trend
percentages of the totals developed in Table 2, using the President's budget
request figures (as subsequently amended) as the base figure.
The fiscal year 1958 figures, it may be seen, are somewhat out of line
with the other figures in the table. This inconsistency is attributable to
Congress' denial of the $100 million of procurement funds noted in connection
with Table 2. If the 1958 figures were recomputed ignoring the $100 million,
the percentages would then be consistent with the rest of the table. Rather,
however, since the source of the deviation now has been duly noted, the 1958
figures will be ignored in drawing inferences from Table 3.
TABLE 3
TREND PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL MARINE CORPS APPROPRIATIONS
FISCAL YEARS 1958—1962
President's Appropriation
Fiscal Budget House Senate Act as
Year Request
(As amended)
Action Act ion Passed
1958 100.0% 90.4% 89
.
2% 88.2%
1959 100.0 97.4 101.2 101.2
1960 100.0 99.8 102.8 102.8
1961 100.0 99.2 104.0 99.5
1962 100.0 93.5 99.6 99.5
While all the conclusions of this study will be consolidated in the next
chapter, since the figures of Tables 2 and 3 are so readily at hand, perhaps
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we may note nov how well verified is one assumption made at the beginning of
this study. I an referring, of course, to the one regarding the nature of
56
changes in appropriations as they are considered by Congress. Referring to
Table 3, and disregarding the 19S8 figures, in every case the Mouse cut the
proposed budget as predicted. Likewise, the Senate restored money in every
case as predicted. Also, as predicted, the final outcome was well within the
five percent variance which constitutes a minor change from the President's
budget.
"Even though it was established at the outset that this study was only
concerned with Marine Corps appropriations, it seems appropriate at this point
to obtain an overview of the entire Department of Defense appropriation picture
during the five year period being discussed. There are two reasons for this.
For one thing, It seems desirable to obtain some sort of perspective against
which Marine Corps appropriations can more meaningfully be measured. In other
words, is one billion dollars a lot or a little, comparatively speaking? The
other reason for providing some comparisons Is to be able to evaluate how well
the Marine Corps presents its case to Congress, assuming that appropriated
dollars are an indication. In other words, is one billion dollars good or bad,
comparatively speaking?
To answer the first of these questions we need to compare the appropria-
tions to the Office of the Secretary of Defense as wall as the various services
during these years. Such a comparison is provided In dollar amounts by Table
4. Perhaps even more helpful are the common-size percentages shown in Table 5.






(LESS CONSTRUCTION AND FOREIGN AID)
FOR FISCAL YEARS 1958—1962
(IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
O.S.D. $ .6 $ 1.373 $ 1.373 $ 1.1 $ 1.518
Array 7.264 8.993 9.376 9.538 11.802
Marine Corps .831 .858 .955 .897 1.107
Navy 9.035 10.502 10.052 11.212 13.398
Air Force 15.930 17.878 17.473 17.158 18.837
Total D.O.D. $33,760 $39,603 $39,228 $39,997 $46,663
TABLE 5
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MILITARY APPROPRIATIONS AS COMMON-SIZE PERCENTAGES
FOR FISCAL YEARS 1958- -1962
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
O.S.D. 2.1% 3.4% 3 5'« 3.0% 3.2%
Army 21.5 22.7 23.9 23.8 25.3
Marine Corps 2.4 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.4
Navy 26.8 26.5 25.6 28.0 28.7
Air Force 47.2 45.2 44.6 42.9 40.4
Total D.O.D. 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
It may be seen, from tables 4 and 5, that the Marine Corps' "billion
dollars" is a comparatively minor percentage of the total amount. In order not
to mislead, however, I trust it will not be too redundant to remind once more
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that the Navy figures are somewhat overstated while the Marine Corps figures
are understated by an amount equal to the Navy overstatement. The Department
of the Navy aggregate is correct, therefore. Again, this apparent imprecision
is due to the fact that the Marine Corps benefits directly from certain sums
rather deeply buried in Navy appropriations.
Having disposed of the first question, let us now examine the second.
We wish to compare the end results of Marine Corps efforts in Congress as shown
in Table 3, with the end results of the other services over the same period.
This information is developed by means of trend percentages in Table 6, using
the President's budget request as amended as the base figure and the amounts
actually appropriated to indicate the trend, year by year.
TABLE 6
PERCENTAGE OF PRESIDENT'S MILITARY BUDGET
ACTUALLY APPROPRIATED
FOR FISCAL YEARS 1958-1962
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
O.S.D. 99. 1% 104.8% 99.0% 98.8% 98.8%
Army 85.8 IOC. 3 104.3 102.3 100.4
Marine Corps 88.2 101.2 102.8 99.5 99*5
Navy 93.5 104.9 99.0 102.8 99.1
Air Force 96.8 101.2 98.3 101.0 102.0
D.O.D. 93.5 102.2 99.9 101.7 100.5
NOTE. President's budget requests (as amended) provide the base of 100%
About all that can be inferred from the figures in Table 6 is that Dr.
Smithies' observation about a five percent change is once more validated.
There appears to be no correlation between an excellent performance before the
appropriations subcommittees and the outcome of the appropriation bill, insofar
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as the Marine Corps Is concerned. In fact, when the five trend percentage* are
averaged out, the Marine Corps has the lowest average of all •• this in spite
of the fact that their performance at the hearings is superior.
This Is a rather interesting outcome. It results in an anomaly wherein,
on the one hand, the Marine Corps is the only service getting less than its
fiscal year 1961 budget, each of the other services getting more, while on the
other hand, during debate on the floor of the House, Mr. Ford (Republican -
Michigan) is saying:
.... I would like to say a word of commendation for the Marine Corps.
Last year they were cut back to 175,000 from a figure of 135*000 or
189,000. The Marine Corps, in order to handle their manpower, took out
of each of the three Marine Corps divisions a certain number of battalion
Landing teams. I think there were eight all together. This was objected
to by some. However, the Marine Corps this year, with the same overall
strength figure, has come back and said: ''Because we are getting better
marines, we are more efficiently running the Marine Corps. We are able
to put back into the Marine Corps two of the battalion Landing teams that
we had to take out previously.
In other words, the Marine Corps, instead of complaining about a re-
duction in manpower, has taken the manpower figures and gotten more front-
line capability from the overall figure than they had previously. I
think this is good manpower management. I want to compliment the Marine
Corps for taking this attitude and obtaining this result.'7
And in the 'other body," as the Congressmen are wont to say, Senator Chevez is
adding, "... The Committee wishes to commend the Marine Corps for its good
management and continued efforts to increase the proportion of its personnel in
eg
the combat elements."-'
Much the same thing occurred in the following year, too. The report of
the House Appropriations Committee on the 1962 bill singled out the Marine Corps
for praise. After commenting that the Committee was "considerably dissappointed'
at the failure within the Department of Defense to establish policies which
U.S., Congressional Record . 86th Cong., 2d Sese., 1960, CVT, Part 7,
p. 9256.
^Ibid., Part 10, p. 12791.
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would limit the amounts of travel funds spent each year, the report added:
The Committee notes with approval the attitude of the Marine Corps in
the matter of various limitations imposed in the appropriation act of last
year -- specifically as to the travel limitation, it was testified that
"We cut the cloth to fit the pattern." 59
Yet the Marine Corps appropriations were under budgeted figures that year,
while Army and Air Force -- and in fact, the total appropriations -- were
greater than budgeted.
These facts suggest that whatever good effects the witnesses may have
on the subcommittees must be blurred somewhat by other factors before the
appropriation process is complete. But, let us save the conclusions for the
next chapter.
5
"u.S., Congress, House, House of Representatives Report No. 574 to




This paper Initially set out to examine three interrelated areas of
interest, all pertaining to Marine Corps appropriations. They were congres-
sional appropriation procedures, the conduct of witnesses at congressional
hearings, and appropriation trends in recent years. The stated purpose was
also threefold. First, there was a general desire to become well acquainted
with the appropriation process. Second, there was a specific desire to
evaluate the effectiveness of Marine Corps witnesses. And third, there was a
specific desire to test the validity of the maxim that in budget action the
House of Representatives reduces, the Senate restores, and the net result is
little change.
At this stage in the proceedings, certainly the first of these desires
has been fulfilled — at least from my point of view. The congressional
appropriation process, which seemed rather awesome at the outset, gradually
assumed more reasonable proportions as the study progressed* And now that the
study is concluded, the critique by Dr. Smithies, quoted at the end of Chapter
IX, has taken on added meaning.
The physical act of reading the records of hearings for any given year
even just those relatively few pages which pertain to the Marine Corps -- and
the committee reports, the records of floor debates and the final act, is
terrifically time consuming. And yet there is a certain fascination, which is
difficult to describe, in seeing it all down in black and white. There is an
equal fascination in watching a hearing. Or, for that matter, in discussing




the process with a well informed observer. In retrospect, this is somewhat
surprising, since as we shall see in a moment, the conclusions reached on the
two specific issues would not seem to warrant attaching that much significance
to this process. In any event, one conclusion which may be stated unequivocally
here and now is that, for an understanding of the congressional appropriation
process, there is no substitute for actually digging in the legislative refer-
ences -- the hearings, the reports, the debates, the law. Reading about the
process, I found, was not quite the same.
The next proposition is not so easily disposed of. There is ample good
advice and instruction on how a witness should prepare himself for, and conduct
himself at, appropriation hearings. Again it was found that reading the records
of previous hearings was excellent preparation. Also, it appears that Marine
Corps witnesses do very well before the subcommittees and that, in return, both
subcommittees treat the witnesses very well, and frequently laud the Marine
Corps for its management efforts. But to translate this exemplary behavior
into concrete monetary results in the appropriation acts in recent years has
not been possible. That there is little or no correlation was demonstrated in
Tables 3 and 6 in the preceding chapter. 1
Not that the Marine Corps is failing to "get its share." In fact,
Table 5 rather indicates that all the other services, including the Marine
Corps, have been increasing their shares at the expense of the Air Force in
ft?
recent years. This study does not presume to judge whether any service should
receive more, less or the same amount in appropriations. But the lack of
Supra





correlation between performance at the hearInge and resultant appropriations
permits some Interesting possibilities of interpretation.
For instance, one might conclude that it just doesn't matter how well
the witnesses do in presenting and justifying their budget. But this would
be a fatuous interpretation* since it runs counter to common sense, as well
as to the advice of subcommittee staff members and the experience of the ser-
vices. There are times, no doubt, when a good performance gains maximum
effect -- for instance, when a new program, concept, weapon or other innovation
is being introduced for the first time. But to conclude that the manner in
which witnesses present their budgets is unimportant because of the lack of
correlation previously noted, is to underestimate the power and influence of
the Congress.
Still another possible interpretation would be that if the Marine Corps
hadn't been doing so well before Congress, the Congress conceivably would have
been appropriating to the Marine Corps much less than it has been. In other
words, things could be much worse without superior performance at the hearings.
Contrary to the previous interpretation, this one seems to overestimate the
influence of Congress on defense appropriations. It seems reasonably clear
from Table 6 that congressional changes to the President's budget are, after
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all, relatively minor on a percentage basis.
What, then, is a reasonable interpretation of the facts which have
been developed? Two interpretations suggest themselves, each capable of
acting at the same time in eompatability one with the other.
Interview with Mr. Aubrey A. Gunnels, Staff Member, House Appropria-





The first of these has already been alluded to and perhaps is obvious.
Simply stated it is that it is relatively more important to sell a service
budget in the executive branch of the government than it is in the legislative
branch. Evidence in support of this interpretation is found in Tables 5 and 6,
the former showing that budget changes do take place, and the latter that the
changes are not made to any essential degree by the Congress. If this be
true, it suggests the area in which effort should be concentrated for maximum
results in the future.
The other interpretation which seems reasonable came to mind as the
result of studying a detailed analysis of changes which the House subcommittee
f>ft
proposed on the President's fiscal year 1961 defense budget. Generally
speaking, the proposed increases were tied to titled programs such as Air De-
fense, Airborne Alert, Army Modernisation, Polaris Program, Space Program, and
so on. Somehow or other, these titles seem to conjure up stronger images than
"military personnel, Marine Corps" or "operation and maintenance, Marine Corps."
While I am not a psychologist, somehow it is a lot easier for me to visualize
a congressman standing foursquare for "Army Modernization" than it is for me to
picture him taking the same kind of stand for "procurement, Marine Corps,"
which would be the vehicle for modernization of equipment.
On the other hand, the decreases shown in the analysis were often
across-the-board type cuts, though not exclusively so. Examples of these are:
Travel (10X), Departmental Administration (107J, and Procurement (37,). These
cuts were being applied to all services alike as an expression of congressional
Supra , p. 41 and 42, respectively.




disapprobation at certain practices or policies or to force economies. The
reader will recall, perhaps, that this was the same year in which the Marine
Corps was commended for its good management. Yet these reductions were
applied.
The lesson to be drawn from these facts is that the Marine Corps should
not put all its stock in the proposition that the virtuous shall be rewarded
and the wicked punished. Eecause of the difficulty Congress has in discrim-
inating between the "virtuous" and the "wicked", chances are that the services'
budgets will continue to be eroded from time to time by similar across-the-
board percentage cuts. The evidence also suggests that if the Marine Corps is
dissatisfied with the amounts being appropriated (and I have not explored this
question at all, nor do I presume to judge) that some recognition of the
"Madison Avenue" techniques of merchandising a package before Congress might
be productive. In fact, the defense budget approach being employed for the
first time this year in a sense does that very thing in a constructive sort of
way for all defense elements. But that would have to be the subject for a
separate study.
This leaves for comment the third area which this paper sought to ex-
amine, namely, the one dealing with the magnitude and direction of budgetary
changes imposed by Congress. This question was the easiest one of all to
evaluate. In effect, the question has already been dealt with and therefore
a summary remark only seems necessary at this point. The figures in Table 3




pattern of decreases, Increases and little net change as the budget moved
through the Congress.
The real significance of this fact is not just the curiosity of it,
but rather that it lends support to what became more by accident than by design
the major conclusion of this work. Restated, the conclusion is that despite
the best efforts of the Marine Corps to capitalize on its superior performance
before Congress, and despite the fanfare and the appearance of climax attached
to the enactment of congressional appropriations, in fact the size of the
Marine Corps' budget and, therefore, the scope of its program is essentially
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